Firenze, 25 October 2006
"Europe's Second Chance"
Let's call it a second chance, following the stalemate-the
crisis-sparked by the stalling of the constitutional process.
I was able to observe France's malaise over Europe first hand
when, as an MEP, I was invited to take part in a series of referendum
campaign events there. The rift between Europe and the public
opinion of one of its great founding nations was extremely vivid
and quite painful. The combined fears of a public opinion seeking
protection from the challenges of globalisation were trained
on a Europe that, all things considered, was without blame.
The problem is that Europe was not seen as an answer to these
challenges, but rather as an element of further aggravation.
I believe that only when we are able to present European integration
as a force that enables us to manage globalisation will we regain
the trust of its people.
Of course, the doomsayers are spurred by declining demographic
trends, by the competitiveness indicators in economies exposed
to new emerging global powers and by political re-nationalisation
trends. Yet it is also true that the 2003 to 2005 crisis-the
internal crisis over the Constitutional Treaty and the major
external crisis over divisions over Iraq-taught us several important
lessons. First of all, it is now clear that when we are divided
internally and externally it is the Union's members, large and
small alike, that end up paying dearly and that risk irrelevance.
In a divided Europe no one is exempt when is comes to facing
major challenges. In the dramatic Iraqi situation those who
joined the "coalition of the willing" counted for
little but, likewise, those who opposed the war, who also played
on a certain anti-American sentiment, were unable to influence
the course of events.
The crisis in the relationship between Europe and its citizens,
heightened by the various rejections of the Constitutional Treaty,
is not an irreversible one. If we look at the data of the most
recent "Euro Barometer" surveys, it is quite clear
that signs of economic recovery have also generated an initial
rekindling of trust in European institutions. This confirms
something we already knew: that citizens want a Europe that
delivers when it comes to their overriding concerns over employment
and security, and a Europe capable of delivering results is
a Europe capable of recovering popularity.
Finally, it must be said that "external" pressure
in favour of integration has increased: the demand for a Europe,
which is generally ascribable to a post-bipolar international
system, which has yet to define its future shape. A united Europe,
capable of impacting on the international order, is one of the
conditions for a multilateral system capable of effectively
managing global crises and challenges.
Europe still has an opportunity ahead of it-if it is able to
understand the strategic changes underway.
The pressure is now from without
If we examine the evolution of European integration over the
past fifty years, we see that it was primarily concerned with
internal development. Inter-European reconciliation after the
Second World War, the dismantling of economic barriers, the
common market and the adoption of the Euro were all factors
in development and stability. This was the outcome of a political
blueprint, but it was also a reflection of the cold war and
the bipolar era: a divided Europe could not but be a "strategic
theatre", rather than a strategic actor.
As a result during the Community's entire initial phase, the
Member States maintained their external prerogatives in full,
in all sectors except for trade. This is a status quo that has
been in crisis since the historic rupture of 1989 and that fails
to respond to the dominant characteristic of today's world:
the distinction between what is internal and what is external
has been largely erased. What we used to consider "internal"
(for example, control over emigration), is tending to become
a shared problem; what we used to consider "external"
(a threat or new threats) can also now come from within.
I believe that Europe has demonstrated a major ability to deal
with the new strategic issues prompted by the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Led by Germany, it promoted the reunification of the continent
through enlargement, but has not shown an equal capacity to
respond to what was to become another watershed: the terrorist
attack of 11 September 2001, which Europe failed to confront
with a common strategy.
To sum up: in its first fifty years Europe looked inwards. Europe
will exist for the next fifty years if it succeeds in looking
outwards, if it makes international security its priority in
areas and sectors vital to our economies and societies. Europe's
citizens appear more aware of this than its leaders. They are
demanding that Europe become a global player (even if, judging
by national budgets, it seems they would like this on a cost-free
basis); the most resistance continues to come from national
leaders who continue to view foreign policy as an "off-limits
zone".
It is clear that all of this involves confronting the economic
challenges associated with globalisation. Allow me to make a
couple of examples: in any event, a common trade policy can
no longer disregard a strategic vision and a common approach
to security (how to deal with China, for example); more effective
development and poverty reduction policies are the pre-requisite
for a more effective response to new security issues, beginning
with emigration.
Europe is directly exposed to a broad array of crises, stretching
from Belarus to the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle
East and Northern Africa. If it does not help to stabilise these
flash points, Europe cannot aspire to managing either migratory
issuers or energy security questions. At the same time, in the
post-September 11th context the Middle East has become a factor
in conflicts within our own societies.
And it is precisely here, with respect to the thorny issue of
strategic planning, that Europe is being given a second chance.
Europe's responses to the Lebanese crisis may be interpreted
as a first sign of reawakening. Europe played a leading political
role by agreeing to provide the largest number of international
troops under the auspices of a UN mission, becoming not simply
a "payer", but rather a strategic "player":
in other words a political and military actor in a region of
priority importance. The Lebanese war also exposed limitations
in European institutions' ability to function according to their
current structure: in this sense even if the decision was taken
on the basis of a European mandate, representing an important
step forward on an institutional level, it still involved a
"coalition of the willing". In the end no common European
decision was required (GAERC of 25 August) to dispatch troops
from individual Member States.
A second external challenge is equally important: that of the
relationship between Russia and the strictly interrelated issue
of energy security. It is in the common interest of all European
countries to stabilise a common "neighbourhood" stretching
from the Ukraine to the Caucasus. This necessarily implies forms
of cooperation, as well as inevitable tensions with Moscow,
which has apparently decided to retain control over its own
foreign neighbourhood. Theoretically we have complementary interests
in the energy sector-Europe wants security of supply from Russia
and Russia wants security of demand-but we are still a long
way from establishing clear rules of cooperation, especially
since Russia is aiming to enter the European distribution sector.
In this latter instance as well we can speak of a second chance.
Just as, during the last century, the integration of coal and
steel manufacturing helped in the establishment of Europe, in
this new century a common external energy policy would aid in
further strengthening it. Nationalism in this sector would only
condemn us to permanent insecurity.
Five acid tests
A series of tests exists by which to gauge our ability to develop
an international role for Europe:
The first and most immediate of these is to rescue the multilateral
WTO talks. I discussed this yesterday with the organization's
director-general, Pascal Lamy. I am convinced that it would
be a grave error to underestimate the political consequences
of this round of talks or the risk that it ends in failure.
With the courage to go that last mile, and with all the sacrifices
entailed, Europe must firmly support a global accord. This would
be an important step towards a multilateral system capable of
governing international trade relations.
Italy feels particularly engaged with regard to a second challenge:
starting on January 1st 2007 we will occupy a seat on the UN
Security Council, where we would like to help ensure full application
of Article 19 (coordination of European positions), which is
often overlooked in practice. This will be a complex undertaking,
but we intend to urge Brussels to provide an initial review
of the most pressing questions on the agenda in New York so
that the EU Security Council Members (five of the fifteen) can
present a united front. Were we to succeed in a similar enterprise,
Europe's voice would carry much more weight. Each of our countries
would carry more weight. Even their vote would count for more.
Going in a similar direction is a proposal that is not a new
one, but one that should be revived: sooner rather than later
it would be desirable to have an EU representative at the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Fourth test: use the European Rapid Reaction Force within the
logic of a UN standing force, in addition to establishing new
forms of cooperation between the EU, NATO and the UN. Finally,
the fifth challenge: to develop a truly European policy on energy,
defining a common European consumer approach to major producers.
Internal constraints
If what I have said so far is true, it follows that we need
more Europe where we have less Europe (for external policies)
and less Europe, perhaps, where there is more (internal regulations).
This gap between European supply and demand derives from some
objective difficulties and the weight of history; but it is
also due to inadequate management by the leaders of EU nations,
some of whom even exploit this gap in order to blame Brussels
for what are, instead, the responsibilities of national governments.
I say this to highlight a point that I feel is important: the
government I belong to is a pro-European government, first and
foremost, because it has no intention of unloading its responsibilities
on Brussels. The Prodi government has no intention of doing
this, nor, as we all know, does the German government, which
will assume the EU duty Presidency at a crucial juncture. And
here again, within this change of attitude by two of the key
countries in Europe, lies an important opportunity not to be
missed: especially because Europe is, first and foremost, a
question of national responsibility.
Turning to the economy, the logic of the euro-of "shared
sovereignty"-must not result in lifting responsibility
from national governments, on whom the willpower and ability
to implement structural reforms still depends. Having said this,
the added value of the European Union would be clearer with
better governance of the euro area, which would benefit from
a stronger euro-group, something that Italy supports. Equally
necessary are a review of the community budget (in a way that
considers growth objectives and innovation in European economies
and curbs agricultural spending) and a boost to shared resources.
These are objectives that Italy is determined to promote together
with that part of the industrial world that believes in rules,
not in protectionism; and that believes in the comparative advantages
of an internal market we must now complete.
Why do the institutions count?
To transform plans into realities, Europe needs a clear vision
founded on, among other things, a solid institutional structure.
Institutions are not an end in themselves, but a means for achieving
common goals.
There is no contradiction between the first and second requirement.
According to some theories, we have been overly concerned with
institutions in recent times and not concerned enough with political
results. This is a red herring: it seems clear to me that we
need both functional common policies and institutions; in other
words, the ability to take decisions, and to form a stronger
and direct democratic relationship with citizens based on transparency.
With regard to clarity of vision, Europe has the challenge of
defining both its internal borders-beginning with a sharing
of responsibilities at the various levels of government-and
its external borders.
What does fixing internal boundaries really mean? It means defining
a shared framework for the European Union, one that is widely
recognised and accepted and which guides collective choices.
From this point of view, and essential to securing consensus,
the spirit of the Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome in 2004
remains crucial. We all know that no real decision on the Constitution
will be taken before 2008, after the end of the electoral cycle
in France and Holland (the two countries that returned a "no"
vote). But we must resume the process, starting with the German
Presidency in 2007, and our objective must be clear.
Indeed, there will be a crucial period next spring with the
French elections, the anticipated change of leadership in the
UK and the Germany Presidency of the EU Council. Our objective
is clear: the spirit of the Treaty must be protected. It must
be protected because the constitutional arrangements under the
Treaty offer the only guarantee that an enlarged Union can function
and therefore achieve results. Not only this: the Treaty marks
a point of no return along the perennially mobile trajectory
of the EU's history and, in reality, we cannot demand consensus
from a political actor whose internal rules remain unclear.
I think that there is a dire need for some sort of fixed goal-at
least at this historic juncture.
The goal we must aspire to involves defining, in series of successive
phases, including a new inter-governmental conference, a secure
institutional structure ahead of the European elections of 2009.
Political realism and common sense demand that we take account
of the negative results of the referenda in the Netherlands
and France and the hesitations of the other Member States who
have suspended procedures for ratification of the Treaty of
29 October 2004. This same realism, however, demands that we
also take into consideration the number of countries that have
ratified the Treaty (sixteen, including Italy) and that represent,
by far, the majority of the EU's population. An alternative
text would make sense only if it were capable of garnering greater
consensus.
It is certainly not easy to identify a point of equilibrium
that ensures conservation of the key Constitutional Treaty principles
and, at the same time, overcomes the resistance that emerged
during the ratification phase. I do not wish to go into detail
at this point on what Italy's bargaining strategy will be in
this regard. However, I would like to announce what I believe
is possible and what, instead, I think are the limits beyond
which we should not go. As one of your colleagues and professors,
Giuliano Amato, has said on various occasions, Italy has no
particular reason to oppose either changes to terminology (what
we want is a "Basic Treaty of the European Union",
whether its called a Constitution or not) or targeted simplifications
by a third party which could make the text more legible while
retaining the significant innovations in some policy areas,
such as on CFSP and judicial and police cooperation.
The limit beyond which Italy believes it would be unwise to
go is equally clear: we want to preserve some reforms that are
key to ensuring a properly functioning enlarged Europe and on
which Member States already have a hard-won agreement. To put
it even more simply: for Italy, in any event, the starting point
is the Constitutional Treaty approved in Rome in 2004, not the
Nice text with a few alterations (the so-called "Nice plus");
some adjustments must be made, and there could even be additions
(a social Protocol, as many have called for). I don't like the
expression 'mini-Treaty' which only serves to put off more weighty
decisions, even though the term could conceal some interesting
points. I would rather use the term 'Core Treaty'.
What reforms do we consider non-negotiable? The establishment
of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs that chairs the Council and
is part of the Commission; the appointment of a permanent President
in the European Council; the extension of the qualified majority
vote on the basis of the dual majority principle; the introduction
of direct democracy mechanisms and a clearer system for the
separation of authority and legislative sources; the granting
of binding legal power to the Charter of Rights (this last innovation
is perhaps the most important and attractive of them all).
These are the key-indicators, in Italy's view, of the ability
of the future basic text of the Union to respond to the priority
needs of democracy and efficiency. We shall not accept any downgrading
of these elements.
Borders and identities
Turning to external borders, my stance is that the process of
enlargement should be completed. As things stand, it is not
yet complete and will only be so once a democratic Europe includes
not only Romania and Bulgaria (in January 2007) but also the
Western Balkans and, at a later point that will involve a longer
process, Turkey. In the first instance, adhesion is a genuine
national mission: Italy has a responsibility and an interest
in steering Europe in this direction. This we are told not only
by the responsibilities of history and our geo-political position,
but also by the specific interest we have in creating an area
of stability at the southeastern borders of the continent. We
can't allow a sort of "enclave" to be formed in the
Balkans, a "no-go" area generating migratory and criminal
flows. If the prospect of full membership were taken off the
negotiating table, Europe's ability to avoid this would be dramatically
reduced. Responsible politicians should not exploit the widespread
unease in Europe over enlargement but should, rather, explain
to public opinion that the costs of Europe not opening its door
to the Balkans would be very high and would, in any event, outweigh
the benefits. Europe must therefore keep open the potential
for countries to join on the basis of the specific progress
being made in the fight against criminality, corruption and
the building of trustworthy institutions.
I would insist on this last point because the results of enlargement
to central-eastern Europe contain an important lesson: it is
easier to reach economic results than solid political results.
In particular, the signs of populism in some of the new Member
States-a populism combined with euro-scepticism-tells us that
we must pay more attention to the political management of enlargement
and not just to the economic acquis communitaire.
This is even truer of Turkey. Here we must encourage the democratic
consolidation of a Muslim country that is also a key geo-political
player in the Middle East. All the necessary conditions (beginning
with the resolution of the Cypriot question) must be met, and
more time is needed.
But we must be clear, as Italy and as Europe, that the door
must remain open, because it is in our strategic interests.
This is also a vital decision in terms of our identity. The
risk of excluding Turkey a priori would have a clear meaning:
succumbing to the temptation to define Europe's identity not
on the basis of shared values but of "opposition"
to something, on differences, in this case our contrast with
the Islamic world.
Naturally it would be easy to foster unity by defining the identity
of the European project as being "in opposition" to
another, a potential external enemy, rather than with reference
to its own tradition. The Europe of the fifties was defined
as being in opposition to the former Soviet sphere of influence.
Post-1989 and post-2001 Europe tends to be defined by some as
being "in opposition" to the United States or to Islam.
But in all cases these are shortsighted and mistaken definitions.
The European Union, also in order to remain united, continues
to need a solid relationship with the United States. What's
more, were Europe to attempt to define itself as being "against
Islam", this would dramatically increase both internal
tensions and external tensions in the vast region of the enlarged
Mediterranean where, instead, we should be taking on new responsibility.
In essence: Europe's identity rests on positive democratic values,
including its capacity for integration and respect for diversity;
not on negative exclusive choices. Were it to embrace this second
path, Europe, in reality, would become the epicentre of the
clash of civilisations. We have no interest whatsoever in favouring
that sort of outcome.
This still means that in order to have internal cohesion and
attain a solid reputation as an international player Europe
must have well-defined limits and external borders. As I have
tried to demonstrate, these must include the Western Balkans;
and it is also in our interest that Turkey be included in the
future, naturally on the condition that it continues to move
towards fully respecting accession criteria. At that point,
in my opinion, enlargement should end, at least for the foreseeable
future. Europe must instead develop more credible neighbourhood
policies, especially towards Russia, Ukraine, the former Soviet
Union, and the Southern Mediterranean.
Enlarged to the southeast and including a key actor in the Middle
East, Europe would be in position to project stability in two
essential directions. From the stability perspective, the completion
of the enlargement process remains a vital goal of the European
Union, as Joschka Fischer has claimed on many occasions It is
up to the political classes of Europe to broker an agreement
on this point, demonstrating to European citizens that enlargement,
which is feared as a threat, is really one of the precise prerequisites
for responding to citizen's perceived security needs, and for
the safeguarding of which they look to the European Union.
More members but more flexibility too
If clarity of the European project involves more certain external
borders, achievement of this carries an additional prerequisite:
the Union's greater internal flexibility. Indeed it is clear
that with an increased Union membership, with the concomitant
increase in internal diversity, there must necessarily be different
speeds of integration. The problem is the following: how to
maintain a unified institutional context in a Europe of varying
speeds. From this point of view as well we must not lose sight
of the progress foreseen as resulting from the Constitutional
Treaty's provisions on strengthened cooperation.
Italy has every interest in participating in specific agreements
regarding further integration or cooperation among various Union
Member States, on the condition that they remain open and inclusive
agreements. In our view it is crucial to strengthen the euro
area and indispensable to stipulate further accords on internal
security and foreign and defence policies.
With the enlargement of the Union it possible to imagine a common
foreign policy structured on the basis of criteria of geographic
responsibility and the creation of "contact groups".
It is also inevitable that not all Member States will carry
the same weight in foreign policy. Only agreement among the
larger members can ensure a capacity for leadership, as has
been negatively illustrated in the case of Iraq. And surely
any serious rupture among the major European powers would guarantee
the entire Union's irrelevance. It follows that the creation
of permanent directoires-a risk being created in negotiations
with Iran-would be viewed as a form of exclusion by the other
European members, thus reducing the means at the Union's disposal.
The risk here too, therefore-which would be all the greater
for the fate of the common defence policy-remains that of reconciling
decision-making capacity and cohesion, i.e. among institutions.
Strengthened cooperation yes, therefore, but open and inclusive;
directoires, no: because they divide and render common decisions
more difficult.
The same principles of leadership and cohesion are to be applied
to the development of internal security, intersecting migration
policies, judiciary cooperation and intelligence sharing. The
progress made since 2001 on this level is much more encouraging
than is generally thought, and adding to it appears to be one
of the clear priorities of the coming years, and which is also
one of the European public's explicit demands. In this case,
employment of the "passarella" clause of the Nice
Treaty could lead to a qualified majority vote. Intergovernmental
cooperation is a community method not to be opposed. There are
various modes of European integration: what will truly count
will be decision-making capacity. The ideal scenario for the
political development of the EU involves a compelling and coherent
nucleus of countries participating in all forms of integration
or further cooperation.
Moreover, it is probable that the Schengen routes will tend
to multiply in number. The point is that this increase of functional
forms of cooperation must be supported by a unified institutional
context. This is really the true frontier: that which lies between
a more flexible political Union and the risk of disintegration.
Conclusion
The Constitutional Treaty stalemate has generated a clear crisis,
but it has also increased awareness of what is at stake: Europe
must regard itself as a strategic actor. As I have attempted
to explain, if this opportunity is to be exploited depends on
national leadership and on the reinstated consensus of a European
citizenry that sees itself as such-European-but that is in need
of greater certainty.
Certainty about the Union's internal structure, and thus its
capacity for making decisions; certainty about external borders,
and thus the identity of Europe. Remaining valid from this standpoint
is the old rule that deepening and enlargement must go hand
in hand.
Nevertheless it would be mistaken to draw from the constitutional
crisis the conclusion that any new enlargement should be halted.
The constraint must function in reverse: the strategic advantages
of new enlargement constitute further incentive to end the constitutional
stalemate.
What's more, there is no d
oubt that, in both areas-deepening and enlargement-, Europe
needs points of arrival, at least in the transitional phase.
A fundamental Treaty and external borders would give the general
enlarged European structure clarity and certainty, leaving further
progress to increased flexibility; to forms of strengthened
cooperation internally and of partnership externally.
In an updated idealist's vision of Europe, we will have common
rules and an internal market coinciding with the enlarged area;
at the same time we will have, in some ulterior enlargement
policies, smaller European groups, as has already been the case
with the euro, for example. It will not be easy to implement
this plan, but it does remain the only way that Europeans can
hope to compete successfully in a 21st century world.
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